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FOR IRA ELLMAN: One More Reason "Why
Making Family Law Is Hard"
David L. Chamberst
Kate Bartlett and Ira worked together as reporters on the ALI project. I
was merely one of nearly thirty advisors to the reporters. The advisors had
no responsibility for drafting, no responsibility for coming up with original
proposals. Our sole job was to come once a year to a meeting in
Philadelphia and take potshots at the drafts that Ira, Kate, and Grace
Blumberg sent to us. At the meetings, the reporters would sit on a platform
and listen to our comments as we moved section by section through a draft.
Ira became a master of reportership. He would nod as we attacked him. He
would smile. You know his grin. He would take lots of notes. He would
answer questions without being unduly defensive.
One might guess that this process of listening over and over to
conflicting comments and then returning with new drafts for a later meeting
would lead Ira and his co-reporters to an insipid end product,
recommendations that were the lowest common denominators among the
dissonant views Ira heard. But Ira, Kate and Grace wisely rejected most of
our comments and took strong positions of their own. Ira proved himself a
precise and careful drafter, with fine judgment. He's also a mensch.
In his talk this afternoon, Ira amply demonstrated why making family
law is hard. It is hard both when policymakers seek to devise rules to affect
the behavior of family members in the future and when they seek to devise
rules to achieve just resolutions of relationships that have already ended.
I'd like to talk for a few minutes about one other reason why making
family law is hard, a reason that I am hardly novel in identifying but one
that makes Ira's achievement even more impressive. Making family law is
hard because it deals with matters about which so many people feel so
intently, feelings that often cause not fully sensible behavior in the
legislative process. Most Americans approach family law issues as if we
were experts. We have all been members of families. We have all watched
other families to whom we are related or who live near us. Most of us,
without much reflection, form views about what makes a good family,
views about behaviors to encourage and reward and about other behaviors
to deter and to punish.
t Wade H. McCree, Jr., Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School.
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As we form our views, many of us are affected by our religious beliefs,
for most religions have a lot to say about marriage and about the appropriate
behavior of spouses and parents. Thus, in the United States in the
nineteenth century, the most contentious policy debates involving family
law rules were carried on in religious terms. Consider, for example, the
struggles to widen the availability of legal divorce, to obtain for married
women rights with regard to the ownership and control of separate property,
and to suppress Mormon polygamy. In the twentieth century, religion has
been no less important in the fights over no-fault divorce, abortion, and, at
this moment, the recognition of same-sex couple relationships.
In the ALI discussions, the advisors almost never, perhaps never,
referred to their religious beliefs as a reason for or against some suggested
rule, but over and over again, the twentieth century's secular form of the
religious debates was present in the room. The issue was gender and the
achieving of just rules in a world in which women are still expected to
perform, and do in fact perform, a much more central role than men in the
caretaking of children, and in which men more frequently than women
develop financial capital and earning capacity over the course of their
adulthood. Thus, though every proposal in the Principles is framed in sex
neutral terms, the potential application of these rules to women as a group
and to men as a group was always visible in discussions. That was true as
to every one of the six substantive chapters in the Principles-the chapters
regarding custody of children, child support, division of property,
compensatory spousal payments (once known as alimony), domestic
partners, and agreements. For example, when the advisory committee
discussed issues of child custody, one of the members of the committee
routinely examined the proposals through the lens of divorcing men, whom
he saw as systematically mistreated and undervalued in child custody
matters. Some others on the committee found this advisor annoying, but
that was in part because they looked almost solely through the lens of
women's experience. Though all of us were ostensibly committed to
developing rules that served the interests of children, we were all, I suspect,
affected by our views about the equities for the adults. We talked one
language (children's needs) but were consciously or unconsciously affected
by the needs of adults. Similarly, the discussions regarding the four
financial chapters-property division, alimony, child support, and the
financial position of domestic partners-were affected by the gendered
roles of men and women, by the likelihood that it would be women who
would be caring for children after divorce and thus needing child support,
and the likelihood that women would have less earning capacity in the
future and thus needing capital and, in some cases, compensatory payments.
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Even the discussion of agreements regarding property were affected by
perceptions about the bargaining position in which women find themselves.
That Ira, working with Kate and Grace, has in the end developed a
coherent set of recommendations that seem sensible for children and fair to
both women and men (by my own notions of fairness), that he persuaded
the testy and opinionated (and largely male) membership of the American
Law Institute to go along with him, is a splendid achievement. Here's to
Ira.
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